

1 June 1978

1. Excellent treatment of the definition problem--treating warning of various types as sub or sub-sub disciplines of current intelligence.
2. Among the sub-disciplines warning of hostilities in progress should be added. "Tactical warning" may come from intelligence sources, moreover, there is an immediate intelligence assessment required even when tactical warning is provided by non-intelligence detection systems.
3. The unstated assumptions behind many parts of the discussion of warning is warning of a nuclear attack, behind others the assumption appears to be warning of some lesser military action or non-military action. It is suggested that the text should be explicit about the warning situation being discussed.
4. The text seems to assume that when US forces are involved in conflicts that the ^{role} ~~role~~ of the DCI would be abruptly changed. We should not concede that it would. First, experience does not suggest when such a change would occur. Even the shifting of responsibility for national intelligence tasking to the Secretary of Defense would probably come about only if the DCI-controlled structure became unresponsive. This shift would probably not occur automatically as soon as US forces were involved in a conflict.
5. Overall the warning structure seems very complicated. The actual function of all the actors are hard to envision.
--Why should the DDCI assume a supra managerial position for warning?

--The senior working group for management of warning and crisis would probably assume a substantive as well as a management role. A reestablishment of an NFIB sub group like the Watch Committee might thus be preferable.

--Perhaps a single warning czar--the Senior Assistant to the DCI for warning would serve a useful role. But why should he be the senior assistant to the DDCI/NI, the Director's senior substantive intelligence officer? Unless the organization cannot handle a function, I believe we should work within it. For example, the IC Staff Director might appoint a senior assistant to deal managerially with the warning problem.

--Finally, in a crisis it seems to me the regional NIO's should have direction of the crisis task force ~~whether~~ an interagency group or drawn from CIA. Also, because of the role of the Soviets in any severe crisis the NIO's on the USSR--particularly the NIO/CF--should be expected to play an important role in the crisis task force and in supporting the DCI.

6. The paper should place less reliance in ^{the} rationale for the role of the DCI in warning and crisis management ^{and} on a divergence of interests of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense (p. 5 & 6). The argument should be that the DCI's responsibilities to the President, etc. continue despite the increased intelligence requirements to support military operations. The text should not imply that the DoD would be insensitive to the question of whether potential or actual adversaries were reacting to our own military preparations, but that the DCI would be. A more pertinent point is that the DCI's supporting staff would probably have to make a heroic effort to determine what US military preparations and actions were underway in order to take this factor into account in their assessment.

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7. The paper cites Brent Scowcroft's plea for some national evaluations of developments of SITREPs during a crisis. ~~This points out that the crisis during which an effort was made to provide some interagency reporting the procedures did not work well.~~ Therefore, the paper recommends scrapping the idea of a national or interagency evaluation being forwarded to the White House. This recommendation does not however dispose of the problem cited by General Scowcroft. That all crises are run from the White House Situation Room as noted in the paper does not justify ^{burying} the Situation Room with a blizzard of raw reports and sometimes ^{ing} conflict, SITREPS from a number of agencies. The paper offers no solution to Brent Scowcroft's problem.

8. I believe that in a serious crisis involving US military preparations high levels of diplomatic activities and a huge increase in information from all open and classified sources, a crisis task force operating from CIA Headquarters cannot acquire sufficient information to fully support the DCI--unless by special communications and presentational means and relaxation of departmental compartmentation, the full array of data held by the NMCC and the Secretary of State can be made available to CIA. This seems unlikely. My suggestion for solution to the crisis management problems involves changes which are more drastic but bureaucratically less complex than those posed in your paper. As summarized in the attached memorandum for George Carver, my suggestion is for a National Intelligence Center paralleling a National Command Center both located at the White House. One would be subordinate to the DCI, the other subordinate to the Special Assistant for National Security ~~Officers~~ ^{Affairs}.

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TS 209311-76
1 April 1976
Copy No 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT : The Role of the DCI in Crises and Conflicts

REFERENCES : (a) Your memorandum to all NIOs re whole
wartime transition problem, 25 Mar 76
(b) DCI letter to the President in response
to NSDM-242, crisis management, 29 Apr 74
(c) NSDM-242, Policy for Planning the Employment
of Nuclear Weapons, 17 Jan 74

1. Your memorandum of 25 March 1976 calling attention to the problem of the role of the DCI in supporting the National Command Authority during wartime serves to focus attention once again on national level crisis management. I submit that the issue for intelligence is not merely the role of the DCI in a wartime, capital C crisis, rather, the issue is the broader question of arrangements for the management of the less serious crisis which are the likely antecedents to war.

2. You will recall that NSDM-242, "Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons," dated 17 January 1974 and signed by the President, called for, inter alia, improvements in crisis management procedures. While this requirement was levied in the context of a Presidential directive concerning employment of nuclear weapons, crisis management procedures must be regarded as a continuum, covering a range of situations from low-intensity crisis to those involving decisions to use nuclear weapons. NSDM-242 (page 4) required that the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence "refine their crisis management procedures to provide timely political-military assessments and recommendations to the National Command Authority to support potential nuclear employment decisions." The current intelligence problem is that under present arrangements the DCI probably cannot carry out this task. The NSDM also directed that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, "conduct a continuing evaluation of the national level crisis management procedures." The NSDM called for an initial report and annual reports thereafter to the President evaluating our crisis management procedures.

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3. In view of your recent experience participating in exercises and the instructions in NSDM-242, which presumably are still operative, I suggest the problem of crisis management procedures be characterized to the DCI as a matter of significance deserving immediate attention. I also suggest that this is a community problem which could be handled by the IC Staff. A summary of my recommendations for a solution, after considering several alternatives, are contained in the attachment.



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Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

Attachments

Tab A - ANIO/SP recommendations
for a solution ("Role of the Director
of Central Intelligence in Crisis
Management")

Tab B - NSDM-242, Policy for Planning
the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

Tab C - DCI letter to President in
response to NSDM-242, crisis manage-
ment

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SUBJECT: The Role of the DCI in Crises and Conflicts

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X1 NIO/SP (2 April 76)

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Attachment to
TS 209311-76
1 April 1976

Role of the Director of Central Intelligence
in Crisis Management

Problem:

1. During a crisis or conflict, under the present intelligence structure and procedures, the DCI would be unable to carry out effectively his responsibilities under statutes and Executive Orders to support the President and the National Security Council (the National Command Authority). As military involvement in a crisis increases, detailed knowledge of the plans and operations of US forces and assessments of the military situation will become more important ingredients in intelligence assessments essential to crisis management. The principal intelligence channel to the President will likely shift to the chain of military command.

2. National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (attached), "Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons," dated January 17, 1974 and signed by the President, recognized deficiencies in crisis management procedures by directing that these procedures be improved and continually evaluated.

Conclusions

3. A solution to this problem requires a central intelligence organization:

- separate from departmental supervision, headed by the DCI;
- with facilities and a location which provide access to all pertinent information;
- capable of rapid evaluation and dissemination of intelligence; and
- having procedures which assure exposing the President and the National Security Council to differing intelligence assessments.

4. It is concluded that effective crisis and conflict management by the President and the National Security Council (the National Command Authority) requires a permanent structure capable of being expanded as required by the nature of the crisis or conflict:

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- a national command center under supervision of the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs staffed with personnel from several government departments and agencies, collocated with

- a national intelligence center under supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence staffed by personnel from all intelligence agencies.

5. The other Washington-level operations and warning centers and their parent organizations would remain intact, providing support for national crisis and conflict management. Support for the National Command Authority when deployed at alternate locations (in the most severe but least likely circumstances) would be drawn from the national command and intelligence centers.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Attachment to
TS 209311-76

29 APR 1974

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In response to National Security Decision Memorandum 242, I have reviewed crisis management procedures within the intelligence community. An enclosure to this letter summarizes current systems, problems, and proposed improvements.

A primary issue of crisis management raised by NSDM 242 (as well as past experience) is that of interagency communication, not only within the intelligence community but also between the intelligence community and other components of the government involved in policy and operations during crises. We have improved interagency communication, not by creating new organizations, but by making better use of the resources of established organizations and of existing communications systems. We have established a remote conferencing network which ties together the watch centers of the principal intelligence organizations and those of the State Department and the Department of Defense. This permits officials and experts in all interested agencies to exchange critical information and to alert decision makers with a minimum of delay and confusion. Furthermore, we are preparing to expand our exploitation of remote conferencing techniques to improve the production of intelligence community assessments in times of crisis.

These efforts to improve the intelligence input to the National Command Authority will, of course, be a continuous process, and will incorporate lessons derived from our post-mortem examinations

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of past and future crises. In all cases, I will ensure that future refinements in the crisis management systems of the intelligence community are compatible with those of the Departments of State and Defense.

Respectfully,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby

Enclosure

cc: Department of State
Department of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Distribution:

IC/PRG/ [] (30 April 1974)

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The Intelligence Community and Crisis Management Procedures

The present procedures related to tension and crisis situations depend upon a variety of communication modes among the watch centers of each agency within the intelligence community. Each intelligence agency has a 24-hour watch center, each of which is connected in turn to subsidiary 24-hour centers in the field. Non-intelligence agencies and headquarters also maintain 24-hour watch centers. Taken together, these centers and their associated communication networks constitute a sort of "national nervous system."

One of the major communication procedures currently used within the intelligence community and in the military operational command structure is the CRITIC system. The CRITIC procedure is designed to allow isolated field locations (including ships) to originate messages which can be transmitted in a matter of minutes and at the highest precedence to the White House, to all intervening elements in the chain of command, and to other interested agencies within the intelligence, foreign policy, and defense establishments.

In the past when a crisis developed, each intelligence agency established an ad hoc group to support the Washington Special Action Group. This resulted in a flood of independent, and often incomplete, reports to the National Command Authority. In response to critiques of this "non-system" of intelligence crisis management, I have appointed permanent National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) for specific geographic and topical areas to be the focal point for the intelligence community's assessments. Although the initial appointments were not made until last November, these officers have already provided us with the means to improve intelligence support during crises--e.g., during the current phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And their activities in the future will help to remove much of the ad hoc character evident in the community's response to past crises.

I have also improved communications among the intelligence agencies and the operational and policy arms of the government. A new secure voice conferencing network known as the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net (NOIWON) has been established. This net simultaneously connects the watch officers of the White House Situation Room, the CIA, NSA, DIA, State, and

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the National Military Command Center (J-3). If a CRITIC message, any other urgent communication, or any variety of especially significant intelligence reports is received by one agency watch center, the NOIWON is used for immediate dissemination of the information to all parties on the net. The watch officers then issue a short advisory report to appropriate officials in the operations and intelligence chains of command, thence to major national consumers. The advisory report also seeks additional needed information from elements in the diplomatic, operational, and intelligence communities and invites feedback from the National Command Authority.

Within the next six months we expect to establish a related system which will use advanced techniques to ensure maximum exploitation of the intelligence community's resources in the minimum amount of time. Specifically, we plan, through this system, to reduce the need for time-consuming, face-to-face committee meetings and thus permit the community to produce finished, all-source evaluations for national consumers with greater dispatch and with more efficiency than is now possible.

I am confident that these improvements will enhance the timeliness and quality of our intelligence products. So too, I believe, will other improvements currently in the works. We are now, for example, instituting procedures for the publication of a National Intelligence Bulletin, a daily intelligence summary which will be produced by an interagency staff and which will replace the existing Central Intelligence Bulletin (issued by CIA). During crises, this summary will, as in the past, be supplemented by Special National Intelligence Estimates and joint memoranda developed by the intelligence community under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officers. And soon, I hope, the community will be able to issue a single community situation summary during crises, replacing those now produced separately by CIA, DIA and INR. In these and other ways, the community will, I think, better serve the needs of the national consumers of intelligence.

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